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The Time for Judgment Has 
Arrived: The Zivotofsky v. 
Clinton Effect on the Political 
Question Doctrine’s Application 
to the War Powers Resolution 
Shannon M. Doughty1 
The War Powers Resolution was enacted to serve as a 
congressional restraint on the President’s power to engage in Military 
Action.  Since then, Congress and the President have disagreed over 
the enforcement and constitutionality of the statute. Nonetheless, courts 
have dismissed cases regarding the War Powers Resolution claiming it 
is of a solely political nature i.e. a political question. The Judiciary 
traditionally apply the political question doctrine to issues regarding 
foreign affairs and, in effect, avoided hearing cases regarding the 
specifics of the war powers pertaining to Executive and Congress. This 
lack of judicial determination has resulted in the and unclear 
assignment of constitutional war powers authority to the branches.  In 
Zivotofsky v. Clinton, the Supreme Court held that the political question 
doctrine cannot be applied to cases regarding statutory and 
constitutional interpretation. This narrowing of the political question 
doctrine potentially lowers the standard of justiciability.  This Comment 
advocates, under the new Zivotofsky standard, for the Supreme Court 
to review statutory and constitutional disputes arising from the War 
Power’s resolution. 
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I. Introduction 
In an attempt to avoid the unilateral military authority of the 
Monarch, the Founding Fathers divided power between the Legislative 
and Executive branches.  Notably, Congress held the power to declare 
and fund war, while the President oversaw the armed forces as the 
Commander-in-Chief.2  But as times have changed, so too has almost 
every aspect of military action.  Some circumstances arise that could 
call for military action but not war.  In the modern era, this separation 
of authority has led to a great debate over exactly where the line is 
drawn between Presidential and Congressional authority.3  In 
particular, Congress has attempted to reign in the President’s ability 
to circumvent Congress’ authority through “military action.”4 
In 1973, Congress passed the War Powers Resolution (“WPR”).5  
Since its enactment the WPR has been a source for criticism, litigation, 
and little enforcement.6  
The courts have developed a determined habit of avoiding cases 
regarding the WPR by holding that the claims are not justiciable, or 
unable to be heard by the courts, under the Art. III powers.7  Lower 
courts have clung to two legal theories to avoid WPR questions on the 
 
2. See generally U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4, 11; U.S. Const. art. 2, § 2. 
3. See Cyrus R. Vance, Striking the Balance: Congress and the President 
Under the War Powers Resolution, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 79, 84 (1984). 
4. Brian Egan & Tess Bridgeman, Top Experts’ Backgrounder: Military 
Action Against Iran and US Domestic Law, JUST SECURITY (Jan. 3, 2020), 
https://www.justsecurity.org/64645/top-experts-backgrounder-military-
action-against-iran-and-us-domestic-law/ [https://perma.cc/P3Y4-
QRWB]. 
5. Vance, supra note 3, at 79.  
6. See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42699, THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION: 
CONCEPTS AND PRACTICE 1 (2019), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42699.pdf.  
7. See, e.g., Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 20 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (affirming 
dismissal for lack of standing without reaching justiciability); Sanchez-
Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 210 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (dismissing claim 
as nonjusticiable political question); Crockett v. Reagan, 720 F.2d 1355, 
1357 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (same); Ange v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 509, 515 
(D.D.C. 1990) (same); Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F. Supp. 333, 341 (D.D.C. 
1987) (same). 
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merits; (1) a lack of standing8 and (2) the involvement of a political 
question9.  However, in Zivotofsky v. Clinton, the Supreme Court 
significantly limited the use of the political question doctrine as a 
defense to a WPR challenge.10  
Zivotofsky has laid the groundwork for future substantive judicial 
determinations on the delegations of foreign affairs and war powers 
between the Executive and Congress.11  The political question doctrine 
is applied to cases where the courts find the issue constitutionally 
delegated to another branch and outside the purview of the judicial 
branch.12  The political question doctrine can be applied in a number 
of circumstances where courts examine whether a particular case is 
justiciable and  is “essentially a function of the separation of powers.”13  
It is a limitation on the judiciary’s scope of their power and what they 
are constitutionally authorized to hear.14  Judicial intervention relating 
to matters of foreign policy and national security is rarely proper 
because they are so exclusively entrusted to the political branches of 
government that the Judiciary has no authority to judge their political 
discretion.15  
Baker v. Carr, the formative case on the political question doctrine, 
concerned a civil rights issue, but the Supreme Court took the liberty 
to opine on the political question doctrine’s frequent applicability to 
foreign affairs.16  The Supreme Court found it could not reach a 
judgement on the merits of a case if any of the following factors applied: 
1) a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the 
issue to a coordinate political department; or 2) a lack of 
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; 
 
8. See, e.g., Campbell, 203 F.3d at 20. While the issue of standing poses a 
barrier to litigation on the constitutionality of the WPR, the vast prior 
literature, opposing arguments, and proposed solutions are outside the 
scope of this comment. See generally Michael D. Ramsey, War Powers 
Litigation After Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 21 CHAP. L. REV. 177 (2018); 
McKaye Neumeister, Note, Reviving the Power of the Purse: 
Appropriation Clause Litigation and National Security Law, 127 YALE L. 
J.. 2512 (2018); Samuel R. Howe, Note, Congress’s War Powers and the 
Political Question Doctrine after Smith v. Obama, 68 DUKE L. J. 1231 
(2019). 
9. See, e.g., Sanchez-Espinoza, 770 F.2d at 210; Crockett, 720 F.2d at 1357. 
10. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189 (2012). 
11. See Ramsey, supra note 8, at 177.  
12. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210-11 (1962). 
13. Id. at 217. 
14. See id. at 210-11.   
15. Id. at 211-12. 
16. See Baker, 369 U.S. 186.  
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or 3) the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy 
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or 4) 
the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution 
without expressing lack of respect due coordinated branches of 
government; or 5) unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a 
political decision already made; or 6) the potentiality of 
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various 
departments on one question.17 
The Baker factors have been used since to refrain from making a  
judgment on the merits regarding issues of foreign affairs and political 
questions.18  In Zivotofsky, the scope of test is narrowed when dealing 
with statutory issues and redefined the comparative importance of the 
individual factors.19  This Comment will propose that the Supreme 
Court’s holding in Zivotofsky v. Clinton, has greatly altered the reach 
of the political question doctrine’s applicability to statutory and 
constitutional analysis and therefore the political question doctrine 
should no longer have a blanket application to cases regarding the 
WPR. 
II. Zivotofsky v. Clinton 
In 2002, Congress enacted a statute allowing Jerusalem-born U.S. 
citizens to state their birthplace on their passports as “Israel.”20  
Menachem Binyamin Zivotofsky’s parents on behalf of Zivotofsky, an 
American citizen born in Jerusalem, requested to the State Department 
that his passport designate “Israel” as his birthplace.21 The State 
Department refused the request based on their policy, at the time, to 
not recognize Jerusalem as a part of Israel.22  The D.C. District Court 
dismissed the case for lack of justiciability because the issue, as a matter 
of foreign policy, fell under the political question doctrine.23 The D.C. 
Circuit Court affirmed.24 
Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the 8-1 majority, reversed the 
D.C. Circuit stating that “[t]he courts are fully capable of determining 
 
17. Id. at 217. 
18. See e.g., Campbell, 203 F.3d 19 at 24-25 (Silberman, J., concurring); 
Sanchez-Espinoza, 770 F.2d at 209; Ange, 752 F.Supp. at 512; Lowry, 676 
F.Supp. at 339-40. See also Crockett, 720 F.2d at 1357. 
19. See generally Zivotofsky, 566 U.S. 189.  
20. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 107-
228, § 214(d), 116 Stat. 1350, 1366 (2002).  
21. Zivotofsky, 566 U.S. at 193.  
22. Id. 
23. Id. 
24. Id. 
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whether [the] statute may be given effect, or instead struck down in 
light of authority conferred on the Executive by the Constitution.”25  
The claim in Zivotofsky required the Supreme Court to decide the 
proper interpretation and constitutionality of the statute.26  Since it is 
the job of the judiciary “to say what the law is,” this was a “familiar 
judicial exercise” for the court.27   
The statutory interpretation turned primarily on the 
constitutionality of §214(d) which gave an individual, born in 
Jerusalem, the right to have “Israel” listed as their place of birth on 
their U.S. passport.28  In determining if the political question doctrine 
applied, Justice Roberts only chose to analyze the first two factors of 
Baker; whether the issue at hand was a “textually demonstrable 
constitutional commitment” to a political department or whether it 
lacked a “judicially manageable standard.”29 
The Supreme Court was not persuaded that the regulation of 
passport policy is a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment 
to a single branch.30  Instead, more generally, it falls under the foreign 
affairs power for which the branches have overlapping authority.31  The 
Government argued passport policymaking is within the President’s 
exclusive “Political Recognition power.”32  In opposition, Zivotofsky 
argued that Congress had the authority, under its Naturalization 
Power, to mandate the recognition of Israel on his passport.33 
While a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards is 
often the impetus used to invoke the political question doctrine, in 
Zivotofsky, the Supreme Court set a lower barrier for parties to prove 
a manageable standard exists.34  Justice Roberts points to the detailed 
arguments proffered by both sides to emphasize the mere fact these 
arguments could be levied indicates there was a manageable standard 
for the Court to follow.35  
 
25. Id. at 191. 
26. Id. at 196.  
27. Id. (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803)). 
28. Id. 
29. Id. at 195, 197-98.  
30. Id. at 197. 
31. See id. at 201 (finding that “[r]esolution of Zivotofsky’s claim demands 
careful examination of the textual, structural, and historical evidence put 
forward by the parties regarding the nature of the statute and of the 
passport and recognition powers”).   
32. Id. at 198. 
33. Id. at 199 (citing U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4).  
34. See id. at 209-10 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
35. Id. at 201. 
 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 52 (2020) 
The Time for Judgment Has Arrived 
720 
The D.C. Circuit had  erred when it phrased its analysis around 
the President’s decision and the exercise of such power cannot be 
reviewed by the courts.36 In Zivotofsky, the Supreme Court rephrased 
the issue at hand within the case.  Instead, they asked whether Congress 
had the authority to pass a statute regulating passports or if that power 
lies with the Executive.37  The Supreme Court could avoid commenting 
on the policy judgement of recognizing Jerusalem as part of Israel and 
instead focus on the constitutionality of a statute which gave Congress 
the power to set such a policy.38  In coming to this conclusion, the 
Supreme Court emphasized they cannot shy away from decisions of 
statutory interpretation because of their prominent political 
overtones.39 
III. Development of the Political Question Doctrine’s 
Application to the War Powers 
Zivotofsky follows a trend of cases discussing the importance of 
judicial guidance on statutory interpretation even when foreign affairs 
are involved.40  In El-Shifa Pharmaceuticals Industries Co. v. U.S,41 a 
pharmaceutical company in Sudan sued President Clinton when he 
bombed its warehouse for being a suspected terrorist site.  El-Shifa 
sought a declaration from the President stating that the government 
incorrectly assumed El-Shifa’s terrorist affiliation and sought relief for 
tort damages.42  The D.C. Circuit refused to hear the case, holding that 
the wisdom of the President’s military judgement was a political 
question and chose not to analyze the statutory claim.43   
While presiding on the D.C. Circuit, Justice Brett Kavanaugh, in 
his concurrence, disagreed and argued for limited deference toward the 
historical precedent of the political question doctrine, stating, “[t]he 
political question doctrine has occupied a more limited place in the 
Supreme Court’s history than is sometimes assumed.”44  Two years 
before Zivotofsky, Justice Kavanaugh pointed out that the Supreme 
Court has never applied the political question doctrine to statutory 
 
36. Id. at 193-94. 
37. Id. at 196. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. (citing INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 943 (1983)). 
40. See generally Campbell, 203 F.3d at 37–41 (Tatel, J., concurring); El-Shifa 
Pharm. Indus. Co. v. U.S., 607 F.3d 836 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Lowry, 676 
F.Supp. 333.  
41. El Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co., 607 F.3d 836. 
42. Id. at 840. 
43. Id.  
44. Id. at 856 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).  
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interpretation.45  Though his reasoning differed from Justice Roberts in 
Zivotofsky, Justice Kavanaugh felt the D.C. Circuit should abstain from 
its use in this case and emphasized the consequences of the Court’s 
silence.46   
In his concurrence, he stressed that by applying the political 
question doctrine in statutory cases the court oversteps the stated 
purpose which requires a constitutional “benign deference to political 
branches.”47  Instead, such an incorrect application of the political 
question doctrine systematically favors one branch of government over 
the other.48  As applied in El-Shifa, it “sub silentio” increased executive 
power, by failing to perform a statutory analysis the “court would be 
establishing that the asserted Executive power is exclusive and 
preclusive, meaning that Congress cannot regulate or limit that power 
by a cause of action or otherwise.”49  On the other hand, if the statute 
clearly limited a sole power of the Executive, such as the delegated 
power of Commander in Chief, then the court’s silence would 
inappropriately expand the power of Congress.50 
IV. The Importance of Framing the Question 
Presented 
The holding of Zivotofsky relied on the framing of the question 
presented.51  Lower courts who had previously examined the political 
question doctrine in the context of foreign affairs and war powers have 
also wrestled with pinpointing the proper scope of the issue.52  If there 
is a strict adherence to statutory analysis regardless of issue, cases 
involving traditionally political issues may be recast as judiciable by 
any tenuous statutory claim.53  In contrast, cases involving a statutory 
or constitutional dilemma, with a political element, could be presented 
as a political decision, but this would be a misapplication of the 
 
45. Id. 
46. Id. at 857. 
47. Id.   
48. Id. 
49. Id.  
50. See Chris Michel, Comment, There’s No Such Thing as a Political 
Question of Statutory Interpretation: The Implications of Zivotofsky v. 
Clinton, 123 YALE L. J. 253, 262 (2013) (“If a statute invades a 
constitutional power committed exclusively to the executive, the court 
should invalidate the law ...”).  
51. See Zivotofsky, 566 U.S. 189. 
52. See generally Campbell, 203 F.3d 19; El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co., 607 
F.3d 836. 
53. See El Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co., 607 F.3d. 850-51. 
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doctrine.54  Zivotofsky found it was within the Court’s discretion to 
redefine the question and hear the case according to its statutory 
claim.55   
Courts are also hesitant to elaborate on the constitutional 
delegation of  authority with regard to the WPR.56  While the courts 
have shied away from deciding what action is prudent within a 
delegated power, they cannot  hesitate to validate that the power is 
constitutionally delegated.57  In Zivotofsky, the D.C. Circuit reasoned 
that the recognition of Jerusalem as a part of Israel was a political 
matter and cannot be reviewed by the courts.58 Instead, the Supreme 
Court found it was not an issue of whether the U.S. is recognizing 
Jerusalem as part of Israel, but whether the President must follow a 
congressional mandate pertaining to passport policy.59  
In Campbell v. Clinton, members of Congress brought suit against 
President Clinton for his use of extended military force in Kosovo in 
opposition to their voting against further military action.60 The D.C. 
Circuit dismissed the case, in part, because the court did not have the 
authority to “define war.”61 Since there lacked a manageable standard 
and the issue was committed to the decision of the other branches.62  In 
Campbell, the correct question to ask was whether Congress had the 
authority, under Article I, to demand the President remove the Armed 
Forces from hostilities despite the President’s Powers as Commander 
in Chief.63 
Again, in El Shifa, the D.C. Circuit refused to review the 
Executive’s “wisdom of retaliatory action taken by the United States.”64  
 
54. See Michel supra note 50, at 256–57 (noting the trend of lower federal 
courts to find statutory political questions and arguing that this trend is 
misguided). 
55. Zivotofsky 566 U.S. at 195.  
56. MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30352, WAR POWERS 
LITIGATION INITIATED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS SINCE THE ENACTMENT OF 
THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION 15 (2012).  
57. See Bennett C. Rushkoff, A Defense of the War Powers Resolution, 93 
YALE L. J. 1330, 1335–36 (1984); Delegation of Legislative Power, Legal 
Information Institute, CORNELL LAW SCHOOL, 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/article-1/section-
1/delegation-of-legislative-power, [https://perma.cc/H4NU-QT8W]. 
58. Zivotofsky, 566 U.S. at 193–94. 
59. Id. at 196. 
60. Campbell, 203 F.3d at 20. 
61. Id. at 28. 
62. Id. at 24-25 (Silberman, J., concurring). 
63. See id. at 37 (Tatel, J., concurring) 
64. El Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co., 607 F.3d 851. 
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As the concurring opinions suggest, this case, in reality, merely relied 
upon whether there was a remedy available under a torts statute or a 
common law cause for defamation.65  The concern over an increase of 
statutory claims altering the use of the political question doctrine is a 
misunderstanding of the role of the judiciary. The judiciary’s role is to 
distinguish issues and dismiss frivolous claims.66  It is not the purpose 
of political question doctrine to evade determining the applicability of 
a statute.67  The D.C. Circuit court should welcome the opportunity to 
refine the boundaries of statutes that affect issues of foreign affairs such 
as the Alien Tort statutes and the WPR.  
V. The War Powers Resolution and Applying the 
Baker Factors 
In 1973, the WPR was enacted by Congress, in response to the 
Vietnam war, as a means of restricting the President’s ability to enter 
and maintain action by the U.S. military into international hostilities 
and conflict.68  The stated purpose of the WPR is to limit the 
President’s authority to introduce the military into hostilities only in 
the following situations: 1) an act of war; 2) statutory approval; or 3) 
in the case of a national emergency. 69  The Act continues:  
In the absence of a declaration of war, in any case in which United 
States Armed Forces are introduced … into hostilities or into 
situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly 
indicated by the circumstances…the President shall submit within 
48 hours to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and to 
the President pro tempore of the Senate a report, in writing….  
Within sixty calendar days after a report is submitted or is 
required to be submitted … the President shall terminate any use 
of United States Armed Forces … unless the Congress: 
(1) has declared war or has enacted a specific authorization for 
such use of United States Armed Forces, 
 
65. Id. at 853-55. 
66. See Court Role and Structure, United States Courts, 
https://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/court-role-and-structure 
[https://perma.cc/PV72-M86T]. 
67. See Michel, supra note 50, at 263 (arguing that, by doing so, “statutory 
political questions deprive the government of valuable guidance by failing 
to demarcate the boundaries of each branch’s authority”).  
68. War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541–1548 (2018); History.com 
Editors, War Powers Act, HISTORY (June 10, 2019), 
https://www.history.com/topics/vietnam-war/war-powers-act. 
69. 50 U.S.C. § 1541(c).  
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(2) has extended by law such sixty-day period, or  
(3) is physically unable to meet as a result of an armed attack 
upon the United States.  
Such sixty-day period shall be extended for not more than an 
additional thirty days if the President determines and certifies to 
the Congress in writing that unavoidable military necessity 
respecting the safety of United States Armed Forces requires.70 
Since the statutes enactment there has been little evidence as to 
whether it has had any actual effect on presidential action.71   The 
constitutionality of the WPR has never been decided.72  No President 
has ever formally conceded its constitutionality and some Presidents 
have argued the WPR itself, or in part, is an unconstitutional overreach 
by Congress.73 
A.  Applying Baker to War Powers Resolution following Zivotofsky 
The Supreme Court has only ever applied the political question 
doctrine in two instances: 1) when the Constitution textually and 
exclusively commits interpretation of the relevant constitutional 
provision to one or both of the political branches, and 2) when there is 
no manageable or judicial standards.74   
1. Textually and Exclusively Committed 
First, when considering whether the Constitution textually and 
exclusively commits an interpretation of a constitutional provision to 
one or both of the political branches, the Supreme Court will find that 
where the delegation of power is ambiguous, the Supreme Court has an 
obligation to determine the constitutionality.75  The war powers are not 
specifically enumerated to just one of the branches.76  The roles of 
 
70. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1543–1544. 
71. John R. Cook, The War Powers Resolution-- A Dim and Fading Legacy, 
45 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 157, 157 (2012).  
72. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 211 (observing that the political question doctrine 
often applies to issues of foreign affairs).  
73. Stephen L. Carter, The Constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution, 
70 Vᴀ. L. Rᴇᴠ. 101, 104 (1984); Michael A. Newton, Inadvertent 
Implications of the War Powers Resolution, 45 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 
173, 174 (2012) (“The constitutional infirmity of the War Powers 
Resolution . . . as a statutory straitjacket on executive authority has been 
uniformly demonstrated by more than forty years of practice.”).  
74. Zivotofsky, 566 U.S. 195. 
75. See id. at 195–96 (finding that where there is no “textually demonstrable 
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political 
department,” the judiciary must then decide whether the “interpretation 
of the statute is correct, and whether the statute is constitutional”).  
76. See generally U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4, 11; U.S. Const. art. 2, §2. 
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Congress and the President in foreign and military affairs “do not fit 
neatly into the classic concepts of the separation of legislative and 
executive powers.”77  The war powers consist of competing and 
intertwined delegations of power which the Court has felt the obligation 
to untangle on many numerous occasions.78   
Zivotofsky v. Kerry,79 the subsequent Supreme Court decision of 
Zivotofsky v. Clinton, compared the Recognition Power of the President 
against the Naturalization Powers of Congress and found the power to 
recognize a foreign government lies within the Executive branch, 
making the law unconstitutional.80  In the context of a war powers 
question, there is arguably a necessity to compare the allocated powers 
of the Commander in Chief to the President and the residual power of 
the Vesting Clause to Congress’s right to declare war and raise an 
army.81  
The Supreme Court’s refusal to address statutory issues of foreign 
affairs fails to recognize the resulting implication to the structure of the 
Constitution.82 Judicial silence on claims made against the president 
can lead to a sub silento increase in the power of the presidency.83  When 
a court fails to review the constitutionality of presidential actions not 
compliant with the WPR, they increase presidential power by ignoring 
the explicit power of Congress to declare war.84  On the other hand, if 
the WPR, or parts, are unconstitutional then the President is 
improperly burdened with complying with its restrictions and 
requirements and stripped of his right to discretion.85  Even in cases 
where the political question doctrine rendered and issue involving the 
WPR non-justiciable, courts have not precluded all forms judicial 
 
77. Vance, supra note 3, at 84. 
78. Id.   
79. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 576 U.S. 1, 135 S.Ct. 2076 (2015) 
[hereinafter Zivotofsky II].  
80. Id. at 2087–88, 2095. 
81. See generally Carter, supra note 73. 
82. See JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43773, ZIVOTOFSKY V. 
KERRY: THE JERUSALEM PASSPORT CASE AND ITS POTENTIAL 
IMPLICATIONS FOR CONGRESS’S FOREIGN AFFAIRS POWERS 23 (2015) 
(discussing implications on Congress’s ability to refute future claims of 
exclusive executive power). 
 
83. See El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co., 607 F.3d at 855 (Kavanaugh, J., 
concurring). 
84. Id. at 857 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).  
85. See id. at 859 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).  
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review on the constitutionality of the WPR.86  On the other hand, the 
D.C. Circuit has stated that “[a] true confrontation between the 
Executive and a unified Congress as evidenced by its passage of 
legislation to enforce the Resolution, would pose a question ripe for 
judicial review.”87 
2. Lack of Judicially Manageable Standards 
In Zivotofsky, Justice Roberts holding practically eliminated the 
second Baker factor, “a lack of judicially manageable standards,” by 
stating there is a manageable legal standard if cognizable arguments 
are able to be made for both sides.88  By this measure, the vast scholarly 
literature and litigation surrounding the WPR represents the already 
existing legal standards and arguments that can be levied around the 
constitutionality of the statute.89   
Some argue that past practice and the history of presidential action 
in war-time has also created a standard for the Supreme Court to follow 
as to where the authority truly lies.  Some scholars argue that “[b]ehind 
the legal bickering, a complex, but unstated, operational code has 
developed, allocating competence to initiate, direct, and terminate 
different types of coercion among the branches.”90  This operational 
code works as a constitutional common law developed with regards to 
use of force that did not amount to war.91 Previously, the President has 
used force outside the purviews of the WPR and authorization of force 
from Congress when he felt it was necessary to protect national 
interests.92  Congress was often compliant in the past while the judiciary 
validated these actions with rulings or with silence.93  These previous 
 
86. See Lowry, 676 F.Supp. at 339 (D.D.C.1987) (finding an issue involving 
the War Powers Resolution nonjusticiable under the political question 
doctrine, but noting that “[j]udicial review of the constitutionality of the 
War Powers Resolution is not [] precluded by this decision”).  
87. Id. 
88. See Zivotofsky, 566 U.S. at 201 (“Recitation of these arguments—which 
sound in familiar principles of constitutional interpretation—is enough to 
establish that this case does not ‘turn on standards that defy judicial 
application.’”).  
89. See generally Carter, supra note 73; William Michael Treanor, Fame, the 
Founding, and the Power to Declare War, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 695 (1997); 
Geoffrey S. Corn, Clinton, Kosovo, and the Final Destruction of the War 
Powers Resolution, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1149 (2001). 
90. Corn, supra note 89, at 1185 (quoting W. Michael Reisman, War Powers: 
The Operational Code of Competence, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 777, 777–78 
(1989)). 
91. Id. (citing Reisman, supra note 90, at 781).  
92. Id. 
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instances have created a “historical gloss” that overshadows war powers 
disputes.94  This has set a precedent that places the WPR in conflict 
with the historical approach to war powers, and therefore provides 
future legal standards for WPR challenges.95  
According to Justice Sotomayor, in her concurrence in Zivotofsky, 
the third factor, “disputes [that call] for decision making beyond the 
court’s competence” can be applied in conjunction with the second 
factor 96  Following this logic, the WPR is not beyond the scope of the 
Court’s competence because of the previously stated reasons that 
revolve around the robust debate over the conflicting powers of war 
and the years of historical precedent.  
3.  Prudential Concerns 
In Zivotofsky, Justice Roberts does not even recognize the last three 
of the Baker factors that Justice Sotomayor refers to as the “prudential 
concerns.”97  While still acknowledging their existence, Justice 
Sotomayor, in her concurrence, urges courts to be “particularly cautious 
before forgoing adjudication of a dispute” on the basis on the last three 
factors, 98 emphasizing  prudential concerns have only ever been 
asserted, by the Supreme Court,  in dicta like Justice Breyer’s dissent.99  
The fourth factor of the Baker considers “the impossibility of a 
court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of 
respect due coordinated branches of government.”100 This factor, though 
addressed in Baker, is diminished as a result of Zivotofsky which clearly 
states that the Courts may not shy away from problems that are 
political in nature.101  Cases regarding the WPR most likely occur when 
both the Executive have reached an impasse.  When Congress and the 
Executive are at odds with the designated military action, the judiciary 
must step in and cannot avoid a ruling on statutory issues for fear of 
stepping on the toes of the other branches.102   
Under the fifth factor, the Court may find an “unusual need for 
unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made.”103  In the 
 
94. See id. at 1156–64, for a discussion of the “historical gloss” concept in 
separation-of-powers analysis. 
95. See id. at 1187–1188.  
96. Zivotofsky, 566 U.S. at 203 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).  
97. Id. 
98. Id. at 204 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).  
99. See id. at 186 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
100. Baker, 369 U.S. 217. 
101. Zivotofsky, 566 U.S. 204-05.  
102. See id. at 205. 
103. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.  
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context of the WPR, judicial deference to ongoing military actions 
could be expected to fall under this standard and possibly prevent a 
court from ordering an injunction against the President to remove 
troops.104  But if the President is found to be involved in an 
unconstitutional conflict, the Court should not avoid the question but 
instead find a practical remedy that does not endanger troops.105 
The sixth and final factor considers whether, upon the court’s 
judgment, “there is a potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious 
pronouncements by various departments on one question.”106  Concern 
about the judiciary causing embarrassment seems frivolous in relation 
to Congress and the President’s long history of public disagreements 
and lawsuits over military power. Since the Supreme Court makes the 
final decision about constitutionality, there is no danger “multifarious 
pronouncements” since the judgment will be binding on all branches.107  
These ongoing lawsuits are in fact already sources of potential 
embarrassment and a judicial ruling may once and for all render a final 
and singular explanation for the constitutionality of the WPR and the 
lengths the President may go as Commander-in-Chief. 
B.  Judicial Analysis Applicable to WPR 
I.  Statutory Analysis 
One of the many constitutional questions regarding the war powers 
is whether the country is “at war.”  The courts have been reluctant to 
hear cases that would define this constitutional term.108  With regards 
to the WPR, the confusion revolves around the statutory term 
“hostilities”.109  Many critics of the WPR question the validity of 
Section 5(b) that states after 92 days the president must remove troops 
 
104. See generally Brett M. Kavanaugh, Congress and the President in 
Wartime, LAWFARE (Nov. 29, 2017), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/congress-and-president-wartime 
(reviewing DAVID BARRON, WAGING WAR: THE CLASH BETWEEN THE 
PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS, 1776 TO ISIS (2016)). 
105. See id. 
106. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. 
107. See The Court and Constitutional Interpretation, SUPREME COURT OF THE 
UNITED STATES, 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/constitutional.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/MA2J-8XFQ].  
108. See Campbell, 203 F.3d at 26 (Silberman, J., concurring) (observing no 
authority to define when “war” has been “declared”); Dellums, 752 
F.Supp. at 1146 (noting in dicta that the action would amount to “war,” 
but denying preliminary injunction for lack of ripeness).  
109. See Campbell, 203 F.3d at 25 (Silberman, J., concurring) (“Prior litigation 
under the WPR has turned on the threshold test whether U.S. forces are 
engaged in hostilities or are in imminent danger of hostilities.”).  
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from hostilities, unless he receives constitutional approval.110  A case 
may arise challenging the controversial 5(b) provision, posing the  
question as to whether Congress has the power to dictate through 
statute the proper movement of troops and military action, in which 
normally lies with executive, unanswered.   
In the past, Congress and the President have disagreed on the 
definition of “hostilities.”111  If the forces are not in hostilities, they do 
not need to be removed, but the WPR fails to define “hostilities.”112  
When Barak Obama sent troops to Libya in 2011, he determined, at 
the advice of the U.S. Department of State Legal advisor, Harold Koh, 
that the military actions in Libya did not amount to hostilities.113  Koh 
determined that military action does not amount to hostilities if the 
mission is limited, the exposure of the armed forces is limited, risk of 
escalation is limited, and the military means are limited. 114 
More recently, there is a disagreement between Congress and the 
Trump Administration as to whether U.S. forces assisting the Saudi-
led coalition in Yemen have been introduced into active or imminent 
hostilities for purposes of the WPR.115  Some Members of Congress 
claimed that by providing support to the Saudi Arabia, U.S. forces have 
been introduced into a “situation where imminent involvement in 
hostilities is clearly indicated” according to the WPR.116  In 2019, the 
House passed a joint resolution “Directing the removal of United States 
Armed Forces from hostilities in the Republic of Yemen that have not 
been authorized by Congress.”117  In response, then-Acting General 
Counsel of the Department of Defense, William Castle, released a letter 
arguing that the premise of the proposed resolution was “flawed” 
because it incorrectly asserted that U.S. forces had been introduced into 
 
110. Vance, supra note 3, at 84-86.   
111. See id. at 92–93 (suggesting an amendment to the WPR that would define 
“hostilities” due to Presidents avoiding the WPR by construing military 
actions as not involving “hostilities”). 
112. Libya and War Powers: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign 
Relations, 112th Cong. 13 (2011) (statement of Harold Hongju Koh, Legal 
Advisor, U.S. Dep’t of State).  
113. Id. at 14-16. 
114. Id. 
115. CONG. RESEARCG SERV., R45046, CONGRESS AND THE WAR IN YEMEN: 
OVERSIGHT AND LEGISLATION 2015-2019, at 9–10 (2019).  
116. Id. at 10. 
117. Id. at 15. 
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“hostilities.118  Consistent with this opinion, President Trump vetoed 
the resolution.119  
Courts have applied the political question doctrine in cases 
involving hostilities because they thought it required political 
judgment.120  A long history of these cases have stated that the courts 
are not equipped to determine “what is war.”121  The better question 
for the judiciary may be “who has the power to define what is war?”.  
Congress has assigned the term “hostilities” as to the scope of the 
WPR.122  Because of the lack of any judicial guidance, the Executive 
has been defining the scope of the word.123  A task the Court may find 
is in the power of Congress or its own purview.  Better defining scope 
hostilities is statutory analysis and not a “textually demonstrable 
constitutional commitment.”124  Further resolving WPR disputes would 
require a judgement of whether the military action was wise, but 
whether the President possessed legal authority to conduct the military 
operation.125 
II.  Determining the Delegation and Scope of Presidential Authority  
 
The Supreme Court found in Zivotofsky it must determine which 
branch had the right to make policy as a question of constitutional and 
statutory interpretation.126  A lack of a specified delegation of war 
powers does not immediately create a gap that cannot be remedied by 
judicial means.  For many years, the ambiguity of presidential power 
has been analyzed by the courts using a three-part analysis first 
proposed in Justice Jackson’s concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube 
Co. v. Sawyer.127  First, the President’s authority is strongest when he 
“acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress,” for 
it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress 
 
118. Oona A. Hathaway, et al., Yemen: Is the U.S. Breaking the Law?,  10 
HARV. NAT’L SECURITY J. 1, 20 (2019).  
119. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45046, CONGRESS AND THE WAR IN YEMEN: 
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120. See generally Campbell, 203 F.3d at 37-41(Tate, J. concurring). 
121. Id. at 25-26 (Silberman, J., concurring). 
122. See id. at 25 (Silberman, J., concurring).  
123. See Vance, supra note 3, at 92.  
124. See Zivotofsky, 566 U.S. at 195–96.  
125. Campbell, 203 F.3d at 40.  
126. Zivotofsky, 566 U.S. at 196.  
127. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635–38 (1952) 
(Jackson, J., concurring). 
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can delegate.”128  Second, there is a “zone of twilight” where there is an 
“absence of either a congressional grant of denial of authority.”129  This 
creates a form of concurrent authority. 130  Third, when the President 
acts incompatibly with Congressional mandates “he can rely only upon 
his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of 
Congress over the matter.”131  To succeed in this third category, the 
President’s asserted power must be both “exclusive” and “conclusive” 
on the issue.132  
Conflicts surrounding the WPR fall under the third tier of the 
Youngstown Sheet model where the president has  the least amount of 
independent authority since his actions are in direct conflict with the 
WPR.133  The President’s power must be exclusive and conclusive.134  
The courts will have to determine if his role as commander in chief, 
head of state, or other constitutional authority rise to such a level.  The 
Supreme Court’s tendency to avoid the nuances of the delegation of 
power within foreign affairs, in favor of a political solution, shirks the 
very important constitutional test set in Youngstown Sheet.   
VI. Conclusion 
Currently, the WPR is to some mostly ignored.135  No president has 
acknowledged its constitutionality.136  There is no indication that any 
president has refrained from utilizing U.S. military force solely because 
of the WPR,137 instead, continuous and constant Executive Actions 
make the resolution itself “something of an archaic expression of an 
earlier era of American politics.”138  The multiple, fruitless lawsuits 
brought by Congress, have further “implicitly reinforced the impotence 
of the Resolution with startling clarity.139  If the Court’s concerns in 
Baker surrounding the  three branches’ exhibition of an impartiality 
and an undivided front in the face of serious political action, each time 
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the President’s is forced to act inconsistently with the WPR displays a 
striking flaw in the balance of our three branches of power.  
The WPR fails to recognize modern-day military action and the 
technological abilities that now allow war to be conducted through 
drone strikes and cyber-attacks.  Military action no longer consists 
solely of sending fighting troops into foreign territory.140  Drone strikes 
are now a common form of military action as opposed to the kinds 
anticipated by the drafters of the statute.141  These attacks can be 
carried out in hours and therefore would be over before the President 
was required to notify Congress of any action.  Moreover, drone strikes 
have historically not fallen within the established definition of Armed 
forces in areas of hostilities.142  Drone strikes require no “on-site 
military,” but may have the same military and foreign affairs 
consequences as a traditional military action.143  The WPR may have 
been an attempt to limit the scope of unauthorized military action, 
however, because the courts have refused to apply it to the changing 
battlefield, Presidents have continued to engage in conflicts without 
constitutional certainty. 
Zivotofsky illustrates the Court’s previous deference to the 
President’s foreign affairs decision has taken a backseat to the concern 
for statutory and constitutional interpretation by the courts.  The 
Court still may not question the wisdom of an Executive acting within 
his specified foreign affairs role, but, they no longer abstain when there 
are competing laws and interests.  The Court continues to defer to the 
Executive when acting within his specified foreign affairs role, but, the 
Court no longer abstains when there are competing laws and interests. 
The weakened potency of the Baker factors may allow cases to be 
brought to question the depth of the presidential power or, in contrast, 
the validity of the WPR itself.  The WPR poses many structural 
concerns for the Court to address, while policy concerns weigh in the 
favor of judicial involvement.  With the evolution of war and our 
constant state of conflict, these crucial and frequently performed powers 
must be defined by the Court. 
The D.C. circuit, as the major venue for such cases, can no longer 
hide behind the presence of a military action, a controversial 
international conflict, or murky international law, but must follow 
Supreme Court precedent.  After Zivotofsky and the appointment of 
Justice Kavanaugh, the Court may be more inclined and better poised 
to analyze the overall separation of powers when it comes to the 
intricacies of the war powers and the unexplored constitutionality of 
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the WPR.  They have a responsibility to hear these arguments and 
weigh in on statutory and constitutional authority.   
 
 
